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GENDER DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: DO SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
Maty Konte and Stephan Klasen
ABSTRACT
Several recent papers have noted gender differences in support for democracy
in Africa, but the causes of this difference remain unclear. This article
investigates whether the observed gender gap is due to the related gender
inequality in social institutions, which affects women’s daily life and deprives
them of social and economic empowerment inside and outside the home.
Using Afrobarometer survey data (rounds 2 [2002–3], 3 [2004–5], and 4 [2008–
9]), the study finds that the gender difference in support for democracy is no
longer significant once gender discrimination is controlled for in the family
code, physical integrity, or civil liberties components of the Social Institutions
and Gender Index (SIGI). Interaction terms show that women’s support for
democracy is only lower in places where gender inequality in these social
institutions is particularly large. This study thus provides evidence that women
who live in countries with favorable institutions toward women are more
supportive of democracy than women who do not.
KEYWORDS
Support for democracy, gender difference, social institutions
JEL Codes: J16, O120, O38
INTRODUCTION
A series of recent studies has investigated the extent to which individuals
in a society support democracy, in line with the political view that has
emphasized the importance of democratic legitimacy on enhancing the
level of democracy in a country.1 For instance, some scholars have pointed
out the impact of citizens’ level of education (Michael Bratton, Robert
Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Geoffrey Evans and Pauline Rose
2007b) based on the work of Lipset, which claims that education is a
precondition for democracy. Others have looked at the relation between
religion and democracy (Charles K. Rowley and Nathanael Smith 2009;
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Robbert Maseland and André van Hoorn 2011). These studies also control
for gender and surprisingly find a gender difference in support for
democracy in developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA), where women are less likely than men to assert that democracy is
the best political regime.
This recurrent finding of a gender gap in support for democracy has
received little attention in the literature and remains an important research
question that needs further investigation. As far as we know, an exception
is the analysis in Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa and Maty Konte (2014) who
have tried to test potential explanations of this gap, focusing on both
differences in socioeconomic characteristics between the two genders and
the institutional environment of the countries in which the women live.
The main result is that the socioeconomic variables are less important than
the institutional variables. Indeed, an increase in the level of the Human
Development Index and in political rights reduces the magnitude of this
gender difference in support for democracy, but controlling for these
institutional variables does not eliminate it. Thus we are still left wondering
what explains this gender difference in support for democracy in SSA. Also,
this study only considered a cross section of countries, thus not exploiting
intertemporal variation within countries.
The present paper seeks to contribute to this literature and adds to
the analysis of discrimination in social institutions that has been omitted
in previous studies. Gender equality has many distinct dimensions and
also involves social institutions.2 Social institutions are long-lasting norms,
traditions, and codes of conduct that find expression in traditions, customs,
cultural practices, and informal and formal laws and guide people’s
behavior and interaction (Boris Branisa, Stephan Klasen, Maria Ziegler,
Denis Drechsler, and Johannes Jütting 2014). An inequality in social
institutions deprives women of autonomy and bargaining power in the
family, limits their access to the market, public spaces, and to different
resources, which may in turn generate additional external forms of
inequality between the two genders.
Discriminatory social institutions that restrict women’s access to resources
are detrimental to welfare and are associated with bad economic and
social features – see, for instance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD; 2010) for the impact of social institutions on
some of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and OECD (2012),
Boris Branisa, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler (2013), Gaëlle Ferrant
and Michele Tuccio (2015), and Asian Development Bank (2013) for
the investigation on food security, fertility, South–South migration, and
education. So far, studies that have focused on the importance of social
institutions on women’s behavior in politics are rare.
This paper seeks to fill this gap and examines the extent to which
social institutions are related to gender and democracy, and it tests
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whether this observed difference in support for democracy in SSA is
due to high gender inequality in social institutions, something that
affects women’s daily lives and deprives them of economic and social
autonomy. We suggest that the way women are treated in a society
might have major implications for the economic, social, and political
functioning of the society (Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler 2013), and we
investigate to what extent this can be related to the gender gap in
acceptance and endorsement of democracy. We hypothesize that gender
inequality in social institutions limits women’s ability to shape their
lives, and thus loss of independence also reduces their support for
democracy. Indeed, we find that gender discrimination in social institutions
that has been previously blamed for slowing down progress in poverty
reduction, schooling, and food security also affects women’s attitudes in
politics, compromising much-needed democratic legitimacy in their own
countries.
The analysis is conducted using the Afrobarometer data, a series of
national surveys on the attitudes of citizens towards democracy, markets,
civil society, and other aspects of development in SSA countries. We start
using the most recent Afrobarometer data, round 4 (2008–9), before
moving to a larger sample where we add rounds 2 (2002–3)3 and 3 (2005–6)
in order to take into account time and country fixed effects simultaneously,
thereby extending the existing literature.
To define support for democracy, we follow the previous literature –
including Geoffrey Evans and Pauline Rose (2007a, 2007b) and Garcia-
Peñalosa and Konte (2014), among others – and create a dichotomous
variable that takes the value of 1 for people who assert that democracy is
the best political regime and zero for all the alternative responses that are
proposed in the surveys (see Section 3). In our sample, we find on average
a gender gap of 8 points, which goes up to 18 in Malawi, 17 in Burkina Faso
and Senegal, 13 in Madagascar, 11 in Zimbabwe and 10 in Mali. To measure
social institutions, we use the 2012 version of the recently created OECD
Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) as well as its subcomponents.4
These indicators inform us about gender discrimination in the family
code, gender discrimination in terms of civil liberties, physical integrity,
access to different forms of resources, and the degree of preference for
boys in a society. An influential literature has recently used this OECD
data at the macro level in order to determine the importance of social
institutions for various economic and social outcomes – for example,
Johannes Jütting, Angela Luci, and Christian Morrisson (2010); OECD
(2010, 2012); Boris Branisa and Maria Ziegler (2011); Branisa, Klasen, and
Ziegler (2013).
Our econometric results show that there is a significant gender difference
in support for democracy in the sample, even conditional on numerous
individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. This finding
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confirms the previous studies, and it is robust to the use of alternative
measures of support for democracy, to the use of different Afrobarometer
samples, and to the inclusion of both time and country fixed effects.
Interestingly, this gap becomes no longer significant after we control for
particular social institutions such as gender discrimination in the family
code, in physical integrity, and in civil liberties, suggesting it is really gender
inequality in social institutions that is driving the gender bias in support for
democracy. We thus find that women living in a country with favorable laws
and norms toward women have a higher degree of support for democracy
than other women.
RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is related to three strands of the literature. First, it contributes
to the literature addressing the determinants of support for democracy
in developing countries using survey data. Education is one of the
standard candidates that have been shown to affect positively the degree of
support for democracy, and influential evidence can be found in Bratton,
Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Evans and Rose (2007a, 2007b),
among others. These analyses have used different frameworks, but they
can all be linked to Lipset’s hypothesis that claims that education is a
prerequisite for democracy. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005)
have provided evidence that educated people in SSA are more likely
to support democratic regimes even though the authors claim that
“awareness of the meaning of democracy and knowledge of leaders”
remains more important than formal schooling (219). Evans and Rose
(2007b) provide a more detailed framework to address the impact of
formal education on the support for democracy in Malawi, decomposing
the level of education into its different stages. They conclude that
primary schooling, which is the level of education of the majority of
educated people in Africa, is sufficient for the endorsement of democracy
and the rejection of nondemocratic regimes in Malawi. Their recent
investigation on the relation between education and support for democracy
in Evans and Rose (2007a) considers a larger sample of African countries,
and their results still support their previous conclusion.5 Robert Mattes
and Dangalira Mughogho (2009) have also recently contributed to this
strand of the literature, focusing on both direct and indirect impacts
of education on the support for democracy through access to the
media and political participation using the Afrobarometer data, round
4, similar to our small sample in this paper.6 Other work has studied
alternative potential determinants of support for democracy, including
for instance religion (Rowley and Smith 2009; Maseland and van Hoorn
2011).7
58
DO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
In these papers, scholars have controlled for the gender of respondents
and have found a significant gender difference in the support for
democracy, with a sign indicating that women are less supportive than
men of democratic regimes. This recurrent gender gap has received little
attention in this literature. An exception is the analysis of the gender gap
in democratic attitudes in SSA countries by Garcia-Peñalosa and Konte
(2014), which showed the importance of some institutions in affecting the
magnitude of this gap but failed to determine what really explains such a
gender difference in this region.
Second, closely related to the present paper is the research that has
analyzed various aspects of the gender difference in African political
behavior. For instance, Hilde Coffe and Catherine Bolzendahl (2011)
have focused on the gender gap in political participation. They show
that individual socioeconomic characteristics that have been found to be
important determinants of the gender gap in political participation in
Western countries (see Nancy Burns [2007]) are not very appropriate for
explaining the gender gap in political participation in African countries.
Instead, they find a strong correlation between a country’s level of formal
institutions and the level of the gender gap in political participation.
These findings have been one of the focal points of the paper by Garcia-
Peñalosa and Konte (2014), who have included countries’ institutional
climate as one of the potential explanations of the gender gap in the
support for democracy in SSA countries. Using the Afrobarometer data,
round 4, they found that higher levels of Human Development Index and
of political rights, which are entered both as separate covariates and as
interaction terms with gender, do not eliminate gender gap but reduce its
magnitude.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature that has focused on
the negative impact of the different forms of gender inequality and
discrimination against women on various economic outcomes such as
education and employment (for instance, Dina Abu-Ghaida and Stephan
Klasen 2004; Stephan Klasen and Francesca Lamanna 2009). Based on this
finding, it is worth looking at the origin of this gender discrimination.
Thus, recently Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler (2013) have posited that gender
inequalities are rooted in gender roles that evolve from (often informal)
institutions that shape everyday life and form role models that people
try to fulfill and satisfy. Indeed, considering social institutions that affect
individuals’ daily lives and deprive women of autonomy in the home is of
major interest for development studies related to gender issues. Previously,
a number of studies have also examined the relation between women’s
autonomy and their fertility decisions at the household level.8
At the cross-country level, it has been more difficult to address the impact
of social institutions on economic outcomes due to the scarcity of data for
this category of institutions. Johannes P. Jütting, Christian Morrisson, Jeff
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Dayton-Johnson, and Denis Drechsler (2008) have presented the Gender,
Institutions, and Development database, collected by the OECD, which
complements the existing gender discrimination indexes; these are the
first data on gender inequality that take into account different measures of
social norms, traditions, and family laws. Branisa and Ziegler (2011) have
used this data in order to reexamine the relation between gender inequality
and corruption and added in the measures of social institutions, a variable
that had been omitted in the previous literature. They have provided
evidence that the level of corruption in a country depends strongly on
the extent to which social institutions deprive women of the freedom to
participate in social and public life.
In addition, the OECD Development Center (2010) has examined the
relation between discriminatory social institutions and some of the eight
MDGs. These studies have specifically concentrated on the eradication of
extreme poverty (MDG 1), the achievement of universal primary education
(MDG 2), and the improvement of maternal health (MDG 5). They show
that more gender equality in decision-making power in the household
enables women to allocate the resources efficiently, which in turn will
increase the welfare of the family, reducing the intensity of poverty, hunger,
and malnutrition. They have also provided evidence that an increase of
women’s decision-making power in the household will expand women’s
ability to ensure complete schooling for their children. They have further
shown that domestic violence against women and genital mutilation of
women decrease women’s rights and decision-making power and are
detrimental to maternal health and fertility control.
In the same spirit, Boris Branisa, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler
(2009) and Branisa et al. (2014) have created a social institutions and
gender-related index (hereafter SIGI) that is an aggregate measure of the
different indicators presented in Jütting et al. (2008). Using cross-country
data, Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler (2013) have analyzed the effect of the
SIGI on various development outcomes. They have found that gender
inequality in social institutions lowers women’s secondary education and
increases fertility rates, child mortality, and the level of corruption. Indeed,
this study has shown the importance of considering social institutions in the
choice of policies intended to address gendered development outcomes.
Using the SIGI index, Jütting, Luci, and Morrisson (2010) have analyzed
the impact of gender discrimination in social institutions on discrimination
between men and women in the job market for forty-four developing
countries. Their results highlight that social institutions are crucial for
women’s activity patterns and job quality. Lastly, Ferrant and Tuccio (2015)
find that high levels of gender inequality in social institutions reduce
South–South migration, but that migration to countries with low levels of
gender inequality in social institutions helps reduce gender inequality in
the source country.
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DATA
The Afrobarometer surveys
To carry out our empirical analysis, we start with the most recent available
data of the Afrobarometer, round 4. For the purpose of robustness, we will
also combine round 4 with rounds 3 and 2 in order to include time and
country fixed effects as well as consider variation in social institutions over
time. The Afrobarometer, round 4, is a collection of surveys that took place
in twenty African countries between March 2008 and June 2009. In total
27,713 individuals ages 18–64 were interviewed face to face, with questions
in the local language, in Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. Random sampling is used at each stage of the sample in order to
provide a representative cross-sectional sample of all the citizens of voting
age within countries.9 Due to missing data for social institutions, we exclude
Cape Verde from our data for the rest of the analysis.
Dependent variable: Support for democracy
The main dependent variable is support for democracy. To build this
variable, we use question 30 of the survey,10 which is: “Which of these three
statements is closest to your opinion?” The possible choices are:
(1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
(2) In some circumstances, a nondemocratic government can be
preferable.
(3) For someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we
have.
(4) I don’t know.
Figure 1 presents the share of respondents of these different possible
answers. Altogether, 69 percent of people answer (1); the remaining 31
percent are divided into 11 percent for answer (2), 12 percent for (3),
and 8 percent “don’t know.” For the purpose of this analysis and following
common practice in the literature, all categories other than “Democracy is
preferable to any other kind of government” are aggregated because it is
not obvious how to order them in terms of preference for a democratic
regime (see also Evans and Rose [2007b]; Garcia-Peñalosa and Konte
[2014]). We thus code the dummy democracy as equal to 1 if the response is
(1), meaning that the individual supports democracy, and democracy equals
0 for any of the alternative responses.
Furthermore, in robustness checks we consider closely related dependent
variables. We particularly define a dummy election and code it to 1 if
respondents agree that leaders should be chosen through regular, open,
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Figure 1 Support for democracy
Source: Afrobarometer, round 4 (2008–9).
and honest elections; a dummy plurality and code it to 1 if respondents
agree with the need for many political parties to make sure that citizens
have real choices in who governs them; a dummy media and code it to 1 if
respondents agree that the media should constantly investigate and report
on corruption and the mistakes made by the government; and finally a
dummy constitution that takes the value 1 if respondents agree that one
should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics from the Afrobarometer
variables used in this paper. Overall, African citizens register a significant
degree of support for democracy with 69 percent of them asserting that
democracy is the best political regime; 79 percent agree that elections
should be regular, open, and honest; 69 percent are in favor of the
existence of multiple political parties in their country; 75 percent support
the freedom of the media; finally, 73 percent of African people agree that
the number of terms for a leader should not exceed two.
Explanatory variables
Our primary explanatory variable is female, which takes the value of 1 for a
woman and 0 for a man; 50.07 percent of the sample consists of women
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Table 1 Afrobarometer: Descriptive statistics
Variable Question No. Percentage
Support for democracy q30 Yes 18,285 69.15
No* 8,159 30.85
Free elections q31 Yes 20,324 79.05
No* 5,386 20.95
Multiple parties q32 Yes 17,435 69.4
No* 7,689 30.6
Freedom of media q35 Yes 18,792 75.81
No* 5,996 24.19
Limited turns for presidents q38 Yes 18,137 73.71
No* 6,468 26.29
Female q101 Male* 13,207 49.93
Female 13,242 50.07
Education q89 No formal* 5,454 20.65




Age q101 < 26* 7,176 27.48
< 36 7,734 29.61
> 35 11,206 42.91
Location URBRUR Urban 9,761 36.9
Rural* 16,688 63.1
Head of the household q2 Yes* 13,646 52.01
No 12,590 47.99
Employment status q94 Inactive 8,386 31.82
Unemployed* 9,042 34.19
Employed 8,930 33.88
Access to media via radio q12a Yes 22,878 86.7
No* 3,539 13.4
Access to media via TV q12b Yes 13,931 52.8
No* 12,451 47.2
Access to media via paper q12c Yes 10,583 40.2
No* 15,744 59.8
Gone without food q8a No* 12,305 44.5
Yes 15,346 55.5
Gone without water q8b No* 14,324 51.77
Yes 13,345 48.23
Gone without medicine q8c No* 11,299 41.01
Yes 16,254 58.99






Variable Question No. Percentage
Corrupted q51 No* 20,510 78.43
Yes* 5,641 21.57
Extent of democracy q42a Full democracy* 7,310 26.38




Don’t know 1,724 6.22




No(others reasons) 6,214 23.62






Source: Afrobarometer, round 4 (2008–9).
Table 2 Support for democracy by gender
Men % Women % Gender gap
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of
government.
73.58 65.64 7.94 (0.0055)***
In some circumstances, a nondemocratic
government can be preferable.
10.78 11.39 0.61 (0.0038)
For someone like me, it does not matter what
kind of government we have.
10.32 12.76 2.44 (0.0038)***
I don’t know. 5.31 10.21 4.9 (0.00038)***
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
Source: Afrobarometer, round 4 (2008–9).
and 49.93 percent of men. Table 2 presents the degree of support for
democracy by gender. The last column of this table informs us about
the test of equality between the proportion of men and the proportion
of women who give similar responses for question 30 on individual
preference for democracy. We observe that the test of the equality of
the proportion of men and the proportion of women is rejected for the
different categories of our main dependent variable except for the category
“in some circumstances a nondemocratic regime can be preferable.”11
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The choice of the additional explanatory variables is based on the existing
theories as well as on the previous literature in this field. As standard
covariates, we include education, age, location, head of household,
employment status, access to media, understanding of the meaning of
democracy, and variables to proxy people’s interest in politics and their
experience of corruption. Education is divided into five categories: no
formal schooling, which includes 20 percent of repondents, incomplete
primary school (18 percent), completed primary (35 percent), secondary
(15 percent), and post-secondary, which has the lowest rate, at less than 11
percent of the sample. We expect that education significantly increases the
degree of support for democracy because educated people are more likely
to be interested in politics and are more able to understand the importance
of democracy. This is in line with Lipset’s hypothesis that education is a
prerequisite for democracy.12
One of the major disadvantages of the Afrobarometer data is the lack of
information on income at the individual level, a variable that may be crucial
for people’s attitudes toward democracy. The two possibilities that we have
chosen for dealing with this issue are, first, to proxy the level of poverty by
using the questions of the survey that ask people how often they (or their
family) have gone without food, water, medicine, or cash. Only 45 percent
have never gone without food, as against 52 percent for water, 41 percent
for medicine, and 22 percent for cash. Second we will also include in the
analysis the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita at the country level.
Another aspect that we will also consider in our analysis is people’s
understanding and involvement in public affairs and politics. To proxy
an individual’s understanding of the meaning of democracy, they are
asked how democratic their country is, with various possible answers: “Not
a democracy,” “A full democracy,” “A democracy with minor or major
problems,” “Do not understand the question,” or “Do not understand what
democracy is.” With this information, we create four different categories
with the control group being people who think that their country is a full
democracy. Finally, individuals are asked whether they have voted in the
last election and whether they are interested in public and political affairs.
Measuring social institutions
Different indices of gender inequality have been proposed in the literature.
Most of them refer to gender differences in outcomes, such as the UNDP’s
gender-related indices, the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index,
and other indicators proposed in the literature (for a review, see Stephen
Klasen and Dana Schüler [2011]).
To measure social institutions, this paper uses the OECD’s SIGI.
These data provide indicators on discriminatory social institutions for
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over 100 developing countries. For the purpose of this paper, we will
consider the aggregate SIGI measure and its five components in order to
characterize the types of inequality in social institutions that really matter
for the endorsement and acceptance of democracy by women. These five
indicators of the SIGI are the degree of discrimination in the family code,
restricted physical integrity, the son-bias index, the restricted resources and
entitlements index, and the restricted civil liberties index. This index was
first launched in 2009 and was recently updated in 2012. Branisa et al.
(2014) have provided a rich description and implication of these indexes,
and explained how they complement existing gender discrimination
measures that are more outcome oriented and are less focused on the
informal part of gender discrimination. The subcomponents of the SIGI
are:.
• Family Code – captures institutions that influence women’s decision
making in the household and gives information on gender inequality
in terms of minimum age of marriage as well as in terms of parental
authority (both during marriage and after divorce) and in inheritance
rights. This index also takes into account the prevalence of women’s
early and forced marriages.
• Physical Integrity – informs us about violence against women and the
existence of legal protection for women from rape, domestic violence,
and genital mutilation. It also measures the extent to which women are
free to engage in family planning.
• Civil Liberties – measures the freedom of participation of women taking
into account the restrictions of women in moving alone and accessing
public space without the agreement of their husband or other male
family member.
• Resource – measures the access of women to several types of property,
such as agricultural or nonagricultural lands, bank loans, and any other
form of credit.
• Son Preference – indicates the degree of gender bias in mortality (proxied
by the share of “missing women”) and the preference for boys in a
society.
While some of these indicators are more focused on gender
discrimination inside of the household (Family Code, Physical Integrity),
other are more oriented toward discrimination outside of the household
(Resources, Civil Liberties). This gives us the opportunity to investigate at
the same time the social and economic constraints that women face inside
as well as outside of the households.
These indexes take values between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the
highest level of gender discrimination, and 0 represents no discrimination.
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Table 3 Social institutions related to gender inequality, 2012
Country SIGI Family Code Physical Integrity Son Preference Resource Civil Liberties
Benin 0.4567 0.534 0.512 0.401 1 0.758
Botswana − 0.375 0.229 − 0.507 0.760
Burkina Faso 0.369 0.706 0.917 0.382 0.507 0.324
Ghana 0.2622 0.429 0.378 0.479 0.689 0.529
Kenya 0.2487 0.383 0.551 0.519 0.649 0.319
Lesotho − 0.456 − 0.368 0 0.264
Liberia 0.344 0.551 0.823 0.423 0 0.749
Madagascar 0.168 0.544 0.210 0.452 0.179 0.513
Malawi 0.218 0.298 0.313 0.391 0.507 0.702
Mali 0.601 1 0.964 0.347 0.179 0.962
Mozambique 0.22 0.510 0.276 0.325 0.507 0.633
Namibia 0.1358 0.330 0.251 0.428 0.507 0.258
Nigeria 0.442 0.601 0.413 0.52 0.676 0.976
Senegal 0.2304 0.611 0.566 0.450 0.167 0.477
South Africa 0.104 0.022 0.172 0.439 0.507 0.193
Tanzania 0.252 0.726 0.513 0.393 0.507 0.241
Uganda 0.3836 0.523 0.639 0.419 1 0.245
Zambia 0.305 0.585 0.502 0.344 0.507 0.746
Zimbabwe − 0.575 − 0.456 0.339 0.719
Mean 0.296 0.514 0.484 0.419 0.470 0.546
Standard Dev. 0.131 0.199 0.244 0.056 0.280 0.255
Source: OECD (2012).
The aggregate SIGI index is obtained using the formula of Foster–Greer–
Thorbecke, which gives greater weight to larger inequality in a particular
component of the index.13 Table 3 shows countries’ levels of gender
inequality in social institutions. We observe that for the recent data on
social institutions provided in 2012, Mali has the highest value for the
discrimination in Family Code, Physical Integrity, and Civil Liberties along
with Nigeria. Benin and Uganda record the worst value for discrimination
in access to resources. In contrast, South Africa has the best position in
terms of Family Code, Physical Integrity, and Civil Liberties, while Lesotho
has a value of 0 for access to resources. Liberia and Mozambique have the
lowest index of Son Preference.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
We have data for J = 1, 2, . . . 19 countries, and nj defines the number of
observations per country , which varies across countries. The variable of
interest is support for democracy denoted by democracy.
67
ARTICLES
Table 4 Support for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Female − 0.409*** − 0.289*** − 0.301*** − 0.198*** − 0.198***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
No formal educ1 0.183*** 0.178*** 0.094* 0.097*
(0.048) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053)
educ2 0.508*** 0.507*** 0.286*** 0.290***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.051)
educ3 0.614*** 0.609*** 0.372*** 0.375***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064)
educ4 0.781*** 0.752*** 0.516*** 0.518***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072)
< 26 age2 0.098** 0.111*** 0.002 0.003
(0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
age3 0.300*** 0.305*** 0.142*** 0.144***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046)
Rural Urban 0.047 0.043 0.049 0.049
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Yes head − 0.042 − 0.037 − 0.018 − 0.018
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Unemployed Employed − 0.017 0.0048 − 0.018 − 0.017
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Inactive − 0.184*** − 0.148** − 0.173** − 0.172**
(0.062) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067)
No tv 0.061 0.056 0.051 0.050
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042)
No radio 0.288*** 0.278*** 0.121** 0.121**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.048) (0.048)
No paper 0.082** 0.075* − 0.012 − 0.011
(0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
No food − 0.169*** − 0.145*** − 0.144***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
No water 0.018 0.012 0.012
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035)
No medicine − 0.049 − 0.042 − 0.044
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
No cash − 0.013 0.022 0.022
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
No corruption − 0.161*** − 0.227*** − 0.229***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039)
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Table 4 Continued
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
extent2 − 0.324*** − 0.323***
(0.038) (0.039)
extent3 − 2.199*** − 2.196***
(0.062) (0.062)




No vote 0.298*** 0.296***
(0.036) (0.036)
Constant 1.056*** 0.204 0.391** 0.748*** 1.271***
(0.132) (0.147) (0.152) (0.144) (0.120)
Fixed-effect NO NO NO NO YES
BIC 30919 29518 28742 26622 26709
Deviance 30889 29356 28529 26348 26254
Intra-Class(ρ) 0.0892 0.0918 0.0926 0.0689 0.0000
No. obs. 26,444 25,654 25,112 24,817 24,817
No. countries 19 19 19 19 19
Notes: Table reports the coefficients from the logit estimation; the dependent variable is support for
democracy using round 4. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Afrobarometer, round 4 (2008–9).
Given the structure of the variable of interest, which is dichotomous,
we estimate a varying-intercept multilevel (or hierarchical) logit model
where individuals are nested within countries. Hence, we will consider
a two-level model where the highest level is the country, and the lowest
level is the respondent. We follow the same specification as in previous
studies, in particular the one in Garcia-Peñalosa and Konte (2014). Let us
denote πij the probability that the individual i living in country j supports
democracy. This probability is given as follows:
πij = Prob(democracyij = 1, ωij) (1)
More explicitly, we can express this probability as:
πij = 11 + exp(−ωij) (2)
Where
ωij = β0 + β1femaleij + β2Xij + εij (3)
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Our parameter of interest is β1, which tells us about the impact of gender
on the probability to support democracy. A negative sign means that being
a woman decreases the probability to support democracy compared to
a man. The vector Xij contains the socioeconomic characteristics of an
individual i in country j. Individuals who live in the same country may
not be independent, thus standard errors may be underestimated with the
traditional regression techniques. Multilevel modeling has the advantage to
take into account such a clustering effect. By allowing the intercept to vary
across countries, we then have
Level 1 : ωij = β0j + β1femaleij + β2Xij + εij , εij ∼ N (0, σ 2)
Level 2 : β0j = β00 + uj , uj ∼ N (0, δ2)
(4)
Thus the general model can be written as follows:
ωij = β00 + β1femaleij + β2Xij + uj + εij (5)
The term uj + εij in equation 5 represents the random part of the model,
where uj is the country-specific effect, and εij is the individual-level error
term. The parameters δ2 and σ 2 are, respectively, the variances of uj and εij .
The main focus in this paper is to test whether the gender gap in
support for democracy is related to the low quality of social institutions
related to gender inequality that affect women’s daily life and deprive
them of autonomy at home. To test this hypothesis we include aggregate
measures of social institutions, as well as the interaction term between social
institutions and gender, to control for the indirect impact of being female
on the probability to support democracy when confronted with different
levels of social institution. In fact the inclusion of this interaction term
between gender and social institutions will allow us to compare the degree
of support for democracy between women living in different countries
with different levels of social institution. Following is the general model
including social institutions:
ωij = β00 + β1femaleij + β2Xij + β3SIj + β4femaleij ∗ SIj + uj + εij (6)
Where, SIj is the indicator of social institutions in country j. The
estimated value of β4 tells us whether women’s degree of support for
democracy depends on the environment in which they live, which is
determined by the quality of the social institutions in their home country.
A negative sign indicates higher discrimination in social institutions and
lower degree of support for democracy.
To measure the correlation between individuals who share the same
country, we use a measure of intraclass correlation which indicates the
proportion of the variance that is explained by the clustering structure.
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The formula for the interclass correlation ρ is given by:
ρ = δ
2
δ2 + σ 2 (7)
By convention in a multilevel logit model the parameter σ 2 is fixed and is
given by: π
2
3 ≈ 3.329 (see Joop Hox [2010]), where π is the mathematical
constant approximately equal to 3.14.
Before turning to the results, it is important to briefly discuss endogeneity
concerns. Endogeneity can arise from reverse causality or unobserved
heterogeneity, and it might affect the coefficients on social institutions
as well as those on gender. Reverse causality is unlikely to be a problem
as support for democracy is unlikely to affect social institutions (nor the
gender of the respondent). But unobserved heterogeneity could be a
concern in a sense that some unmeasured third variable is correlated
with gender or social institutions as well as support for democracy. Of
course, part of the purpose of this paper is precisely to see whether gender
inequality in social institutions is such an unmeasured third variable, but
there could be other unmeasured third variables. To the extent that these
unmeasured variables are country specific and time invariant, our country
fixed effects in our panel model would capture them. But of course we
are unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is time varying
or individual specific. In this sense, we can only be sure that we have
conditional correlations that can be interpreted as causal only when the
assumptions above are met.
RESULTS
Support for democracy
Table 4 presents the results of the estimations of the multilevel logit
model without controlling for social institutions. The dependent variable
is support for democracy. The intraclass correlation values reported at
the bottom of the table indicate the share of the variance explained by
the characteristics at the country level. For instance in the first column,
the intraclass correlation is equal to 0.089, meaning that 9 percent of the
variance is explained by the country characteristics. This confirms that
taking into account the clustering effect may improve the quality of the
estimations of the standard errors. We now start with column 1, where
the dummy female is the only covariate, and later on the following rows
we control for progressively more individual socioeconomic characteristics.
Across these columns we can see that the coefficient on female is negative
and significant at the conventional level of 1 percent, meaning that being
female decreases significantly the probability of asserting that democracy
is the best political regime. The coefficient on female decreases across
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columns when we control for additional variables, but it still remains
significant at the 1 percent level and continues to have a sizable magnitude.
This table confirms the previous results in the literature on the sizable and
significant gender gap in support for democracy in SSA. Note also that the
gap persists even if we include country fixed effects in the last column.
Turning now to the other individual characteristics included in the
regression, we find that education increases the probability of supporting
democracy, and this effect increases with the level of education. The
variable age is an important determinant of support for democracy, and
we find that, somewhat surprisingly, young people support democracy less
than their elders. Little attention has been given to explaining the behavior
of Africa’s youth in politics, but some evidence can be found in Danielle
Resnick and Daniela Casale (2011, 2014), who find that youth in SSA have
a lower incentive to vote compared to the rest of the population and are
also less partisan than their elders. Urban residents are more supportive of
democracy than those from rural areas, but this effect becomes insignificant
once we control for employment status and access to different sources
of media. We do not find a significant difference between employed and
inactive individuals, but being unemployed decreases the probability of
supporting democracy.
We have investigated the impact of people’s understanding of
democracy, and column 4 shows that people who know the meaning of
democracy are more likely than others to support democracy. Also, the
participation in political and public activities is an important determinant
of an individual’s preference for democracy. For instance, people who
have not voted in the last elections are less likely to support democracy
than people who have voted. Besides, individuals who are not interested
in public affairs are less likely than others to assert that democracy is
the best political regime. To be sure, these coefficients can hardly be
considered as causal, but they are interesting conditional correlations. In
addition, individuals who have experienced corruption favor democracy
less than those who have never experienced corruption. This is in line with
the existing literature, which has noted the negative correlation between
corruption and democracy.
Table 5 presents additional estimations using alternative proxies for
support for democracy. We first consider the fact that women may be
likely to answer less extremely, or generally opt for “don’t know.” Thus,
we create two new dummies, dem1 and dem2: the former excludes people
who reply either “for someone like me, it does not matter what type of
government we have” or “I don’t know.” The latter measure of democracy,
dem2, excludes only individuals who give the response “I don’t know.”
Results using dem1 and dem2 are presented in columns 1 and 2, and
highlight that the coefficients on female remain negative and significant
at the 1 percent conventional level, even though the magnitude of the
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coefficients on gender becomes lower than in Table 4. Furthermore, we
use alternative proxies for support for democracy: election, plurality, freedom
of the media, and constraint on the constitution. We find that there is a
gender difference in support for democracy using these indicators, but
this difference disappears once we use election as proxy for support for
democracy.
We have shown that there is a gender difference in support for democracy
in SSA that is robust to the use of alternative measures for support for
democracy. This result is again a confirmation of the findings in the
previous literature – including Evans and Rose (2007b), Garcia-Peñalosa
and Konte (2014), among others. Yet, little attention has been paid
to explaining this gap, and we are still left wondering what explains
this gender difference in support for democracy in this region where
democracy is a relatively new concept.
Support for democracy and social institutions related to gender
discrimination
We investigate the role of social institutions in the degree of support for
democracy in SSA, testing whether this observed gender difference can
be explained by the low quality of the social institutions related to the
gender inequality that affects women’s daily life and deprives them of
economic, social, and political autonomy inside and outside of home. We
posit that women are less likely to support democracy in societies where
women’s economic and social independence and autonomy is strongly
circumscribed by discriminatory social institutions. A plausible reason for
this effect is that women who experience little autonomy in their personal
lives are less likely to demand or favor the freedom to choose their political
leaders.
We now add the different measures of social institutions from the OECD
2012 SIGI index described above and their interaction terms with female
to our baseline model in order to take into account both the direct and
the indirect impacts of social institutions on the degree of support for
democracy. The results are presented in Table 6 and show that controlling
for some of the social institutions related to gender discrimination renders
the gender difference in support for democracy much smaller and mostly
statistically insignificant. The first column of Table 6 reports the results
where we have controlled for the overall SIGI index and its interaction with
gender. It shows that in SSA countries with greater gender inequality in
social institutions, support for democracy is significantly higher; but the
gender gap in support for democracy is small and no longer significant, and
the interaction is also not significant. But since the SIGI combines rather
different aspects of social institutions, it is well worth examining the SIGI’s
subcomponents separately to better understand the link between gender
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Table 5 Alternative indicators for democracy
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Female − 0.149*** − 0.156*** − 0.041 − 0.175*** − 0.205*** − 0.137***
(0.046) (0.035) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034)
No formal educ1 0.069 0.051 0.029 − 0.019 0.145*** 0.239***
(0.075) (0.057) (0.059) (0.049) (0.055) (0.054)
educ2 0.247*** 0.188*** 0.027 0.106** 0.138*** 0.346***
(0.072) (0.055) (0.056) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052)
educ3 0.277*** 0.274*** 0.108 0.174*** 0.262*** 0.501***
(0.088) (0.067) (0.069) (0.059) (0.065) (0.065)
educ4 0.359*** 0.431*** 0.209*** 0.310*** 0.343*** 0.566***
(0.097) (0.076) (0.077) (0.067) (0.074) (0.074)
< 26 age2 − 0.002 − 0.010 0.064 − 0.067* 0.058 0.072
(0.059) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
age3 0.117* 0.127*** 0.180*** − 0.063 0.0433 0.0938**
(0.063) (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047)
Rural Urban 0.026 0.020 0.043 0.046 0.129*** 0.207***
(0.049) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
Yes head 0.005 − 0.036 0.083** 0.022 0.048 − 0.036
(0.052) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.038) (0.03)
Unemployed Employed − 0.009 − 0.044 − 0.121*** 0.025 0.047 − 0.012
(0.048) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
Inactive − 0.274*** − 0.232*** − 0.236*** − 0.095 − 0.028 − 0.147**
(0.089) (0.069) (0.072) (0.063) (0.072) (0.069)
constant 2.177*** 1.411*** 1.199*** 0.592*** 0.972*** 0.530***
(0.163) (0.126) (0.123) (0.107) (0.123) (0.117)
Fixed-
effect
YES YES YES YES YES YES
BIC 15603 24338 23864 29104 25295 25219
Deviance 15157 23786 23410 28650 24842 24767
No. obs. 20,206 23,121 24,236 23,732 23,430 23,253
No.
countries
19 19 19 19 19 19
Notes: Table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for
support democracy using alternative measures. The dependent variable is dem1 in (1), dem2 in (2),
election in (3), plurality in (4), media in (5), and constitution in (6). The variables dem1 and dem2
correspond to our main dummy democracy, excluding the categories “For someone like me it does
not matter what type of government we have” and “I don’t know” for the former, and only the
category “I don’t know” for the latter. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. All the additional variables reported in
Table 6 are included in the estimations but are not reported.
Source: Afrobarometer, round 4 (2008–9).
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inequality in social institutions and support for democracy (Branisa et al.
2014).
Column 2 of Table 6 thus considers the SIGI subindex, Family Code.
The direct impact of female on the probability of supporting democracy
becomes insignificant. Turning to the coefficients on family code and its
interaction with gender, we find that for men, discrimination in the Family
Code category does not affect their degree of support for democracy, but
such discrimination has a negative, sizable, and significant impact on the
degree of support for democracy by women. Indeed, in countries with a
high degree of discrimination in Family Code, women exhibit a much lower
degree of support for democracy than do women who live in countries with
less discrimination.
The results are similar when we replace the discrimination in Family
Code by discrimination in Physical Integrity as in column 3. In column
4, social institutions are measured using gender discrimination in Civil
Liberties, and the results show that the gender gap in support for
democracy becomes insignificant but the interaction between female and
Civil Liberties is significant only at 10 percent. Column 5 shows the
estimates of the baseline model when we have controlled for the index of
inequality in access to resources, which measures the degree of restriction
of access by women to different types of resources. We do not find that
the gender difference disappears once we control for discrimination in
access to resources, a variable that has been crucial in other studies that
have focused on economic outcomes using cross-sectional data. In addition,
the discrimination in access to resources increases the degree of support
for democracy by men, but it does not have any impact on the degree of
support for democracy by women. Finally, column 6 of the table shows
the results using the subindex Son Preference, which measures the extent
to which boys are preferred to girls as well as the number of missing
women. We find that the coefficient on female becomes insignificant but
neither the coefficient on son nor the interaction term with female remains
significant. The last three columns show that the results regarding Family
Code, Physical Integrity, and Civil Liberties are robust to the inclusion
of per capita income and its interaction with female. Interestingly, these
coefficients never turn out to be significant.
We have shown the role of social institutions related to gender inequality
in moderating the effect of gender difference in preference for democratic
regimes in nineteen SSA countries. The results have confirmed our main
hypothesis, which posited that the gender difference in the support for
democracy is related to gender discrimination in social institutions that
affects women’s daily life inside and outside their own home, suggesting
that the way women are treated in a society might also have major
implications for the political functioning of that society. Indeed, Table 6









Table 6 Gender difference for support in democracy and social institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Male Female − 0.106 − 0.047 − 0.058 − 0.099 − 0.251*** − 0.003 0.047 − 0.001 − 0.193








Familycode*female − 0.313** − 0.334**
(0.140) (0.151)
Physical Integrity 0.693 0.748
(0.451) (0.491)
PhysicaIntegrity*female − 0.317** − 0.330**
(0.134) (0.152)
Civil liberties 0.825* 0.851**
(0.434) (0.428)
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Son preference 1.499
(2.134)
Son preference*female − 0.471
(0.573)
Ln(GDP) 0.075 0.026 0.059
(0.092) (0.094) (0.084)
Ln(GDP)*female − 0.008 − 0.005 0.009
(0.022) (0.025) (0.021)
Constant 0.269 0.520 0.505* 0.304 0.350 0.072 − 0.299 0.218 − 0.306
(0.273) (0.335) (0.259) (0.274) (0.218) (0.904) (1.060) (1.069) (0.898)
No. obs. 21,355 24,817 22,524 24,817 24,817 23,648 24,817 22,524 24,817
No. countries 16 19 17 19 19 18 19 17 19
Notes: Table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for democracy. All the additional variables that are in Table 1 are
included in the estimations but are not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.









Table 7 Large sample: Gender difference in support for democracy and social institutions
Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Male Female − 0.169*** − 0.160 − 0.166 − 0.147 − 0.113 − 0.177 − 0.200 − 0.407*** − 0.425*** − 0.463***
(0.020) (0.167) (0.169) (0.172) (0.186) (0.184) (0.183) (0.142) (0.138) (0.137)
ln(GDP) 0.008 − 0.007 − 0.025 0.114** 0.145** − 0.059 − 0.031 − 0.044 − 0.0031
(0.048) (0.060) (0.058) (0.053) (0.069) (0.064) (0.057) (0.058) (0.047)
ln(GDP)*female 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.030** 0.032** 0.028**













































Reference Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


















Constant 1.266*** 0.324 1.320** 1.386*** 0.324 − 0.021 1.680*** 0.468 1.513*** 1.626***
(0.081) (0.584) (0.528) (0.520) (0.609) (0.648) (0.590) (0.531) (0.517) (0.518)
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 67448 67,448 67,448 67,448 60,846 61,903 62,912 67,448 67,448 67,448
No. countries 19 19 19 19 17 18 18 19 19 19
Notes: Table reports coefficients from the logit estimation, the dependent variable is support for democracy. All the additional variables reported in Table 1 are
included in the estimations but are not reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
Source: Afrobarometer rounds 4, 3, and 2 (2008–9).
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Physical Integrity, and Civil Liberties, the gender difference in support
for democracy becomes insignificant. Furthermore women who live in
countries with a high level of discrimination are less likely to support
democracy than women who live in countries with more equitable social
institutions. This last point implies that gender attitudes and preferences
in politics can be determined by the bias of laws and norms toward women,
particularly norms regarding family life and women’s autonomy. Indeed,
women living in a country with more equitable laws and norms toward
women are more supportive of democracy; this could indicate that women
in these societies see the political system as a way to protext their autonomy
and thus are more supportive of a democratic political system; conversely,
in societies where discrimination in norms and social institutions are large,
women may have less faith in the ability of a democratic system to serve
their interests and needs.
Intertemporal sample
We combine round 4 with rounds 3 and 2 in order to take into account
time and country fixed effects, but we will then have an unbalanced sample
since some countries are missing in rounds 2 and 3.14 In the combined
sample we observe that 61.2 percent of women favor democracy as the best
political regime against 70.3 percent of men, yielding a gender gap of 9
points, one point higher than the value recorded when we only considered
round 4.15
To shed light on the role of social institutions in the explanations of this
significant gender difference, we use the two separate datasets on inequality
in social institutions provided by the OECD Development Centre. The
first dataset was presented in 2009; the second was launched recently in
2012 and significantly improves the quality of the previous data in 2009.
To collect the information on the SIGI subindicators for 2012 for each
country, the OECD Development Center took the most recent available
information up to 2011 while most of the information dates from 2003–
5. Since we believe that the level of gender discrimination embedded in
social institutions may explain people’s attitudes and their support for
democracy, the measures of social institutions that we consider should be
available before or at the starting date of the surveys. Given that, we propose
to combine the data in 2009 and in 2012 following three different strategies.
First, we simply use the values of 2012 for all three rounds. However, in
this manner, we might be ignoring the variation in social institutions over
time, even though we expect that these types of institution are persistent
and do not vary a lot over time. In the second strategy, we propose to
use the measure of 2012 for rounds 4 and 3, and the value in 2009 for
round 2 – bearing in mind, however, that the two different versions of
the SIGI are not fully comparable between 2009 and 2012. Finally, the
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last strategy is to use data in 2012 for round 4 and the data in 2009 for
rounds 3 and 2, again noting that there are comparability issues across
the two rounds of the SIGI. We then denote the first possibility by SI, SI 1
denotes the second one and SI 2 for the last one, where SI stands for “social
institutions.”
Table 7 presents the results where we first report the coefficient on
female without controlling for social institutions in column 1; then we add
the measures of social institutions, particularly those that were previously
significant: inequality in Family Code, Physical Integrity, and Civil Liberties.
In the different specifications, we have controlled for both time and
country fixed effects, as well as for all the variables that have been already
controlled in Table 4 but not reported here. The coefficient on female in
column 1 remains negative and significant at the 1 percent level, and its
magnitude is close to the results reported in our best specifications in Table
6, columns 5 and 6. We find that across rows 2–10, after controlling for
the different measures of FC and PI, the coefficients on female become
insignificant. However, the interaction terms between female and social
institutions are significant in all of these columns, supporting the previous
conclusion where we argued that women living in countries with high level
of discrimination in social institutions are less likely to support democracy
than other women. These various results fit well with the earlier results we
got with the smaller sample, where we ignored any possible time variation.
However, in the last three columns, where we controlled for the indicators
of social institutions related to inequality in Civil Liberties, we find that the
coefficient on gender remains negative and significant at the conventional
level of 1 percent. In fact, adding the earlier waves, controlling for country
and time fixed effects or using different versions of the SIGI index and
its components have no impact of the results, which can therefore be
considered fairly robust.
Here, we combined the three rounds of the Afrobarometer to be able
to capture the time dimension. The results have shown that the gender
difference in support for democracy holds in this larger sample and
becomes insignificant once we control for discrimination in Family Code
and Physical Integrity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite the many desirable features of democracy and the prominent role
of women’s attitudes in promoting development, a wide range of studies
have recently highlighted that women are less likely than men to support
democracy in SSA. This observed difference raises the question of whether
women’s behavior may hinder the much-needed legitimacy of democracy
in SSA, a region in which democracy has had a shorter history. Yet, little
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effort has been made to address this issue, and at this stage we are still left
wondering what really explains this difference between the genders.
This paper reexamines the link between the support for democracy and
gender and adds a new, previously omitted variable – social institutions
– to capture the extent to which women are discriminated against in
a society. Social institutions related to gender inequality are long-lasting
norms, traditions, and codes of conduct that deprive women of autonomy
and bargaining power at home and limit their access to different types of
resource. The recent literature has documented the importance of social
institutions on several development strategies but so far, few studies have
focused on the importance of these institutions for women’s behavior in
politics.
This paper tries to incorporate gender discrimination in social
institutions into this framework and addresses the question of whether
this observed gender gap is due to the omission of social institutions
related to gender inequality, something that affects women’s daily life
and deprives them of social, economic, and political autonomy inside and
outside the home. We follow the idea that the way women are treated
in a society might also affect their attitudes toward the political process.
Our analysis is conducted using three rounds of the Afrobarometer. To
measure social institutions we use the recent OECD data on SIGI and its
five subcomponents: Family Code, Civil Liberties, Physical Integrity, Son
Preference, and restrictions on access to different forms of Resources.
The results show that there is a significant gender difference in the
support for democracy in the sample, but this gap is no longer significant
after we control for gender discrimination in the Family Code, Physical
Integrity, and Civil Liberties components of the SIGI. The results are robust
to the use of different Afrobarometer surveys and to the inclusion of time
and country fixed effects. This study has also provided evidence that more
egalitarian social institutions that do not support women’s early and forced
marriages, make effective laws against different types of violence against
women, and promote their freedom of movement and access to public
space have the potential of increasing the degree of women’s support for
democracy. Apparently, in these more egalitarian societies, women have
more faith in democracy, arguably because the political system is one way
to support their autonomy and rights.
While we are unable to prove causality in this empirical setup, these
findings support the proposition that social institutions are important
determinants of the gender gap in the political arena, reducing the level
of democratic legitimacy in SSA countries, which may in turn hamper the
amount of democracy in these countries. This paper constitutes therefore
an additional confirmation of the importance of promoting policies that
will have the potential to improve the quality of social institutions and
promote women’s empowerment.
82
DO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
Maty Komte
United-Nations University - UNU-MERIT
Boschstraat 24, 6211 AX, Maastricht, Netherlands
e-mail: konte@merit.unu.edu
Stephan Klasen
Department of Economics, University of Göttingen
Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany
e-mail: sklasen@uni-goettingen.de
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Tony Addison, Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa, Seif Dendir,
and James Thurlow for their helpful comments. Maty Konte is grateful for
financial support from UNU-MERIT and UNU-WIDER.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Maty Konte is Research Fellow on Governance and Development
Economics at the United Nations University-MERIT in Maastricht, the
Netherlands.
Stephan Klasen is Professor of Development Economics at the University of
Göttingen, Germany.
NOTES
1 The definition of legitimacy attitudes by Lipset (1963) is “Belief that the existing
political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (Matthew D. Fails
and Heather N. Pierce [2010]): 64). Larry Diamond (1999) argues that the stability
of democratic systems requires a belief in the legitimacy of democracy by people.
Moreover, Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton (2007) report that “No matter how
well or badly international aid donors or academic think tanks rate the extent of
democracy in a given country, this form of regime will only consolidate if ordinary
people believe that democracy is being supplied” (192).
2 Among the different dimensions of gender equality we can note economic
participation, health and well-being, political empowerment, and education
attainment.
3 Round 2 data for Zimbabwe is from 2004.
4 For the intertemporal sample we combine versions 2009 and 2012, noting that there
are comparability issues across these two verisons of the SIGI. See below for details.
5 Furthermore, Evans and Rose (2007a : iii) have figured out mechanisms through
which education affects support for democracy and argued that “the mechanisms
through which schooling influences democratic support relate to cognitive elements
of political comprehension and involvement that are consistent with an intrinsic
model of the effect of education on democratic values and outcomes rather than
a view of education as a marker of resource inequalities.”
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6 See also M. Najeeb Shafiq (2010) for further investigation of the impact of education
on support for democracy in other developing countries. Using the Pew Global
Attitudes Project surveys, Shafiq (2010) finds that education has a strong effect on
support for democracy in Lebanon, Jordan, and Pakistan.
7 Using the World Value Surveys, Rowley and Smith (2009) find that predominantly
Muslim countries have a higher degree of support for democracy than other
countries. Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) challenge the paradoxical finding of
high support yet little experience of democracy in Muslim countries, arguing that the
positive attitudes of citizens in Muslim countries toward democracy are not limited to
Muslim countries and can be explained by the theory of decreasing marginal utility,
which suggests that people more highly value scarcer goods.
8 For example, one can note the analysis by Michelle J. Hindin (2000) for a case study
in Zimbabwe, Anastasia J. Gage (1995) for Togo, Deborah Balk (1994) for a case study
in Bangladesh, among others.
9 Further details on the data are available at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey.
10 It refers to question number 37 for round 3, and 38 for round 2.
11 Similar results using the alternative proxies for support for democracy are found
but not shown here because of space contraints. Readers are invited to refer to the
working paper version, Maty Konte (2014) available at the UNU-MERIT Working
Paper series.
12 To look at whether the degree of support for democracy is associated with the
people’s experience, we group individuals into three different age categories: those
who are between ages 18 and 25 (27 percent of the sample), people between ages
26 and 35 (29 percent), and people older than 35 (43 percent of the sample). For
the place of residence we have distinguished between people living in rural areas (63
percent) versus urban areas (36 percent). Employment status has three categories:
inactive, accounting for 31 percent of the sample, and active, sorted into unemployed
(34 percent) and employed (33 percent). To measure access to media, we consider
separately access to news from radio, from TV, and from newspapers. For each, the
variable access to media is a dummy equal to 0 if the individual attests never having
had access to media from the given source, and 1 otherwise. In the sample, almost
87 percent have access to news from radio, against 54 percent for TV. Indeed, access
to TV remains costly in developing countries, especially for people leaving in rural
areas. Finally, only 40.61 percent have access to news from newspapers, a number
which is not surprising given the fact that reading newspapers requires some level of
education, yet in this dataset 20 percent of the people do not have formal schooling,
and 18 percent have not completed their primary degree.
13 Further details on the SIGI index can be found in Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler (2009).
14 Round 3 contains only eighteen countries since it excludes Burkina Faso and Liberia,
while round 2 includes neither these two countries nor Benin or Madagascar. In
the combined data, 65.7 percent of the population support democracy against 34.26
percent who do not.
15 For round 3 the gender gap is equal to 12.84 points; it decreases to 7.4 in round 2.
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